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ABSTRACT 
Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict  
by Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad* 
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to 
remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the 
contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target. 
 
Keywords: Timing of conflict, war, easy targets 
JEL Classification: B31, D74, H77 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
''Leichte Beute'' und der Zeitpunkt eines Konflikts 
Die Gegner in einem potentiellen Konflikt müssen sich in jeder Periode 
entscheiden, ob sie den Konflikt eröffnen oder ob sie weiterhin friedlich bleiben. 
Wir zeigen, dass die Gegner warten und erst dann den Konflikt initiieren, wenn 
der Gegner hinreichend schwach und damit leicht  zu besiegen ist. 
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1 Introduction
Enemies often live their lives in parallel, waiting for decades for the optimal
time to attack one another, and it can take a long time for the actual con-
test to take place. This is true for individuals within a company who can
spend eﬀort on inßuence activities to try to defeat the opponent, for rival
politicians within the same party who compete for candidacy, for owners
of rival companies, for medieval rulers of independent states trying to con-
quer each others territory, or for nation states, as with the Franco-German,
Arab-Israeli, Greek-Turkish, Indo-Pakistani conßicts, and for the US and the
Soviet Union in the cold war decades. As Maoz and Mor (2002) point out,
over the past centuries, a majority of international conßicts have been en-
during rivalries. We consider the factors that determine the timing of the
actual contest or war.
A question that is closely related and that precedes this analysis of timing
is the question of why war takes place at all. War wastes resources. Rational
decision makers should therefore negotiate and Þnd a bargaining solution
that avoids this ineﬃciency. War then plays an important role as an outside
option or threat point in bargaining (see, e.g., Powell 1996, 1999 and Werner
1999) even though the actual war may not take place. Actual war may still
take place if bargaining fails to reach an outcome that, for both rivals, is
superior to going to war. Fearon (1994, 1995) and Filson and Werner (2002)
highlight incomplete information as a possible source of war and its role
in bargaining. Another reason why bargaining need not solve the conßict
is discussed in Fearon (1995). The rivals may face commitment problems
and other constraints in bargaining that could make war a rational policy
outcome.
We consider a situation with symmetric information but with several
plausible constraints on bargaining that make peaceful negotiation outcomes
impossible. The type of contract incompleteness that eliminates the scope
for peaceful settlement in our set-up is similar to the one in GarÞnkel and
Skaperdas (2000) and relies on the non-contractibility of future resources or
future inßuence. More precisely, we consider two rulers. Each controls a
territory and receives income in each period as long as he stays in charge.
They can remain peaceful and live in parallel for ever, but each one can also
decide to attack the other ruler in any period, in which case the outcome of a
contest decides who rules both territories for all future time. Rulers cannot
borrow against future expected income. Accordingly, they can use only their
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current period resources for a possible conßict or for consumption. Rivals
cannot commit to abstaining from future threats of war, or from attack,
unless they are Þnally defeated. Second, rulers could negotiate and agree on
allocating current output, but cannot write binding contracts on property
rights to resources or income in future periods or control rights to military
power in future periods.1 Instead, a government of a territory always controls
the use of the resources its territory produces in the respective time period,
and can use them to consume or to Þght. In this set-up, the major channels
for conßict resolution by bargaining are blocked. The only contract about
future property or control rights that is feasible, and can be enforced, is a
take-over that eliminates the adversary.2
We take the absence of negotiations as a starting point and consider the
timing of the wasteful contest or war in sections 2, 3 and 4. In section 5
we conÞrm more formally that negotiations could not change the outcome in
this framework. We Þnd that war is initiated by the stronger party when it
is suﬃciently inexpensive for one of the conßicting parties to initiate war and
defeat the rival player, which is the case if the weaker player is suﬃciently
weak. Our result makes a prediction that is the opposite of the power tran-
sition theory (Organski and Kugler (1980), Morrow (1996)) that suggests
that conßict or war is more likely once the weaker rival becomes stronger and
particularly when the weaker rival is about to surpass the stronger power. In
this theory the time paths of players capabilities develop according to some
long-term trends. Accordingly, the dominant power that anticipates a fur-
ther decline in relative strength may initiate war before it loses its dominance.
In our framework, absolute and relative capabilities evolve along stochastic
paths and they ßuctuate according to intertemporally independent random
processes. For this reason, players who are strong in one period could be
strong or weak in the next period. The only way to establish dominance for
the future is to defeat the rival and to acquire his territory. A player may
therefore initiate a contest if it is inexpensive to defeat the rival, which is the
1To give an example: France could not prevent German rearmament after World War II.
A country can always simply violate a contract that commits it to abstaining from building
weapons or from future military action, and without exercising permanent military control,
it is diﬃcult to control the resources of a country ruled by another government.
2A literature on resource allocation if property rights are not costlessly enforced high-
lights the relevance of this assumption, particularly in an international context. See, e.g.,
Skaperdas (2003) for an outline and a survey.
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case in a period in which the rival is suﬃciently weak.3
The research question is also related to questions associated with dynamic
optimization and the option value principle. In a situation in which superior
information may arrive later, an agent may delay an irreversible investment
choice in order to preserve an option value (McDonald and Siegel 1986, and
Pindyck 1991 for an overview). In a game theory context, the arrival of
information is often endogenous and depends on the co-players actions. For
instance, agents may want to delay their own investment decision and so
wait and observe the experience the co-players gain from investing early (e.g.,
Chamley and Gale 1994, Gale 1996 and Thimann and Thum 1998). What
makes the decision to go to war diﬀerent from the option value considerations
in uncertain irreversible investment problems is that a player does not have
full control over whether to enter a period of war: each player can start a
war, but if one player starts the war, the other player is forced to go to war
as well.
In the next section we describe the general framework in which conßict
takes place, the technology of conßict, the set of possible actions and timing
of actions. Our main result is reported in section 3, showing that war or
conßict is delayed until one of the rival players becomes a suﬃciently easy
target. Section 4 considers a diﬀerent technology of conßict and shows that
relative strength may also play a role for the timing of conßict or war. Section
5 explains why negotiations must fail, and war cannot be avoided given the
assumptions about what contracts are feasible and enforceable between rival
players, and what contracts are not enforceable. This section justiÞes why
we disregard negotiations in the analysis in the previous sections. Section 6
concludes.
2 A formal approach
We consider two rivals who rule territories of equal size A and B, respec-
tively. The meaning of territories is broad here, they are the zones of inßuence
from which rulers can extract some rent. One example in which we frame our
3Delay of open conßict in full information contests has also been considered in a paper
by Bester and Konrad (2002). They show that asymmetry between attack and defense
can also explain delay. Here we take a diﬀerent approach and consider a contest that is
fully symmetric with respect to attack and defense. Hence, the desire to be the defender
does not cause the delay.
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analysis would be the kingdoms of two rulers who can try to conquer each
other. Some non-storable revenue is generated from each of the territories in
each period, and for an inÞnite sequence of periods. Suppose these revenues
are TA(t) and TB(t) in period t, and are identically and independently drawn
from a distribution F (T ) with no mass points and a support [0, T¯ ] for both
territories. The period revenues of a territory accrue to whomever rules the
territory in the respective period.
Rulers maximize their expected income over an inÞnite lifetime. There-
fore at any period t a risk-neutral ruler values ownership of a perfectly secure
territory as the present value of the inÞnite sequence of expected revenues,
i.e.,
∞X
k=0
ET
(1 + r)k
=
ET
r
, (1)
where ET is the expected revenue from owning a territory in any period,
and r is the rate of interest which is exogenously given. As the revenue is
non-storable, there is no way to shift resources intertemporally. Therefore, r
is determined by the rulers discount rate of future consumption.
Because there are two rulers, their rulership is not absolutely safe and
their beneÞt will be diﬀerent from (1). One ruler can try to conquer the
other rulers territory, expell the other ruler, and from then on become the
ruler of both territories. Such an attempt is called a contest or war and will
be described in detail below. If there is a contest in a period, one of the rulers
will be eliminated as a result; hence, the outcome of this contest determines
who will safely rule both territories for all future periods. Thus, there can
be a contest in, at most, one period, and this contest determines the owner
of all future rents from both territories.
Suppose no conßict has occurred prior to period t. In period t, both
rulers Þrst observe the resources TA(t) and TB(t) available to them in this
period. Now each ruler decides whether to initiate the contest in this period.
If neither starts a contest, they remain peaceful until the beginning of period
t+1. They observe their resources in t+1, and the same consideration about
starting the contest recurs in period t + 1. If at least one of them decides
for a contest, the contest will take place in this period. If this happens, the
rulers simultaneously choose the resources they want to use in the contest.
These resources are denoted xA(t) and xB(t).4 As borrowing or lending
between the rivals and from a third party can be ruled out due to the lack
4More formally, this can be seen as a two-stage process in which the contestants have
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of commitment, they cannot spend more than their resources in this period;
i.e., xA(t) ∈ [0, TA(t)] and xB(t) ∈ [0, TB(t)]. The resources available in a
given period are like a budget cap on the resources that can be used in the
conßict.
Here the rivals Þrst decide whether to declare war or not. War takes
place in a period t if at least one rival declares war, and if the decision is for
war, they choose how much of the resources available in this period to use
in the conßict and how much to consume. This choice of timing may need
some comments. GarÞnkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Anbarci, Skaperdas
and Syropoulos (2002) for instance, assume that contestants Þrst determine
their stocks of contest resources (weapons) and, once these stocks are chosen
and observed by all contestants, they consider whether to Þght or to settle.5
Their timing may well adequately describe battles or a blitzkrieg.6 We con-
sider the reverse timing, in which contest eﬀort is chosen only if a contest
takes place, which could be more suitable for describing a war that may
go on for a long period. The period considered in the theoretical analysis
here is an exogenously given time interval that, depending on the context,
can be arbitrarily long. In a war that goes on for a considerable period of
time, the initial stock of weapons is small compared to the total amount of
resources that can be turned into weapons and can be used in the conßict.
For instance, during the Þrst four years of World War II, national incomes
grew steadily in the major countries involved, and military production grew
at even higher rates, because it took time to reorganize the industry and
to increase military production both absolutely and as a share of national
income.7 The productive capacity and the resources that a contestant could
the opportunity to commit. Each contestant can decide whether or not to declare war
in a Þrst stage. If neither declares war, there is a binding commitment for both of them:
neither has the ability to enter a military conßict in this period. However, if one (or both)
of them declares war, each of them can use any amount of their own period income in a
military conßict against the other.
5Anbarci, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) compare diﬀerent bargaining solutions with
respect to the decision to build up stocks of weapons. A key aspect of their analysis is
that the possibility of future negotiations and settlement induces the contestants to spend
resources on producing weapons, because the stock of weapons aﬀects the rivals threat
points.
6Rotte and Schmidt (2002) Þnd strong evidence that numerical superiority matters for
battleÞeld success. Similarly, Hochheimer (1967, p.83) reports that, at the end of the 16th
century, an upcoming battle could have been decided by simply counting the numbers of
soldiers on both sides.
7McNeill (1982, 353n.) reports that German armaments production in World War II
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mobilize over the period of conßict is decisive. The productive capacity of
the contestants will be directed towards military production once the conßict
has started, and the total productive capacity becomes the relevant measure
of military power.
The relationship between the contestants eﬀorts and the conßict outcome
is described by a contest success function. This function maps the resources
xA and xB that A and B spend in the contest into win probabilities. The
probability of A winning is denoted
pA(xA, xB). (2)
B wins with the remaining probability 1 − pA(xA, xB). There are several
parametric versions of this function that are micro-founded, axiomatized and
used in the literature, and we will consider two particular types of contest
success function in the next sections.
In what follows we analyse the timing of the contest in a subgame perfect
equilibrium concentrating on the case when the two rivals use stationary
and symmetric strategies. Before we analyse this in greater detail for more
speciÞc contest success functions, we state that the contest can always occur
as a failure to coordinate here:
Proposition 1 An equilibrium in which there is no delay always exists.
A proof is as follows. Suppose A expects that B will declare war in the
Þrst period. Then A is indiﬀerent to whether to declare war or not to declare
war, as the war takes place in any case. A may as well declare war. Hence,
As choice to declare war on B and Bs choice to declare war on A are optimal
responses to each other. ¤
While the equilibrium without delay always exists, it is of limited interest.
In many cases it constitutes a coordination failure and yields lower payoﬀs
to both contestants than those they could obtain by some equilibrium with
delay.
peaked in July 1944, six years after the beginning of the war. According to Harrison
(2000, p.21), Germanys military outlays as a percentage of national income rose from 23
percent in 1939 to 70 percent in 1943, while GDP steadily grew in these years as well. The
data for other major countries involved in World War II are similar but less extreme. The
US needed 3 years to fully reorganize its industry towards armaments production. UK
military production also peaked in 1943, in the Þfth year of war (see Harrison 2000, p.15).
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3 Fully discriminatory contests
To analyse how the decision to initiate a contest depends on period resources,
we consider the following benchmark case. Suppose that the contestant who
spends the largest amount of eﬀort in the contest wins with certainty. If both
contestants spend the same eﬀort then let the contestant win who has more
resources available that he could use in the conßict, and let A and B have
the same win probability if they are symmetric with respect to their eﬀorts
and with respect to their period resources TA and TB.8 More formally, let
the contest success function if the contest takes place in a particular period
be given by
pA(xA, xB) =

1 if xA > xB
α(TA, TB) if xA = xB with
 α = 1 if TA > TBα = 1/2 if TA = TB
α = 0 if TA < TB
0 if xA < xB
.
(3)
First consider the equilibrium outcome of a subgame in which the contest
takes place. The following lemma describes the equilibrium outcome of a
contest with two contestants who choose contest eﬀorts xA ∈ [0, TA] and
xB ∈ [0, TB] and face a contest success function (3) if the contest is about
an exogenously given prize Z. We will later deÞne what is the prize Z of
winning the contest in the multi-period framework here, but for a general
characterization of the contest equilibrium Z > 0 be some prize of arbitrary
size.
Lemma 1 Suppose contestants A and B compete for a prize of size Z > 0.
Let the contest success function be given by (3). Then no equilibrium in pure
strategies exists.
The (unique) equilibrium in mixed strategies is described by cumulative
density functions of eﬀorts xA ≥ 0 and xB ≥ 0 for the case TA < TB. The
cumulative density functions are
GR(xR) =
½
xR
Z
for xR ∈ [0, Z]
1 for xR > Z
for R ∈ {A,B} (4)
if TA ≥ Z, with contest payoﬀ equal to zero for A and B, and the sum of
expected contest eﬀorts equal to Z.
8This tie-breaking rule about what happens if xA = xB is convenient. It simpliÞes the
analysis but does not qualitatively aﬀect the results.
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The equilibrium cumulative density functions are
GA(xA) =
½
1− TA
Z
+ xA
Z
for xA ∈ [0, TA]
1 for xA ≥ TA (5)
and
GB(xB) =
½
xB
Z
for xB ∈ [0, TA)
1 for xB ≥ TA (6)
if TA < Z. The contest payoﬀs are zero for A and Z − TA for B and the
sum of expected contest eﬀorts is equal to TA in this case.
For a proof see Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and deVries
(1996) for the case in which both contestants have resources that exceed Z
and Che and Gale (1997) for the case in which at least one contestant is
resource constrained and could not spend as much as Z.
Typically no equilibrium in pure strategies exists in a contest if the contes-
tant who spends the highest eﬀort wins with certainty. Instead, contestants
choose mixed strategies in the equilibrium and randomize their eﬀorts ac-
cording to the distribution functions G in the lemma.9 The precise shape
of these distribution functions does not matter for our analysis. However,
equilibrium payoﬀs are important for what follows. Both contestants have
a payoﬀ of zero in the equilibrium if they both could choose eﬀort up to
the value of the prize. This is intuitive, given the Þerce competition that
emerges in this case. If, however, one of the contestants (say, A) is resource
constrained in the sense that he cannot choose an amount of eﬀort that
equals the value of the prize, the payoﬀ of the contestant with the higher
amount of resources in the contest period must have a positive equilibrium
payoﬀ: B could always out compete A by an eﬀort that just exceeds the
maximum eﬀort that A could choose by spending all his period resources on
the contest, and B would then win with certainty and still spend less than
the full amount of the prize. This explains why the less resource constrained
contestant receives a payoﬀ equal to Z −min{TA, TB}. The contestant with
the lower endowment will have zero payoﬀ also in this case. Intuitively, this
contestant can always be out competed by the contestant with the higher
endowment.
9The non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is illustrated by a simple contradic-
tion. Suppose there is a pure strategy equilibrium in which player A chooses xA. In the
equilibrium B anticipates this choice, and Bs optimal reaction is either xB = 0 or some
xB that exceeds xA by a small amount. For both these choices xA is not optimal for A.
This establishes the contradiction.
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Return now to the decision whether to initiate the contest or war in a
given period. It will turn out that there is a critical amount of resources
denoted T ∗ such that the contest is initiated in the equilibrium if one of the
contestants resources in this period fall short of T ∗. For establishing this
result and for Þnding the critical amount T ∗, the following deÞnitions are
useful. Let
p(T ∗) ≡ prob(min{TA, TB} ≤ T ∗) = 2F (T ∗)− [F (T ∗)]2. (7)
Here, p(T ∗) is the probability that at least one of the rivals period endow-
ments in period t does not exceed T ∗, where T ∗ is simply some given positive
number at this point of the analysis. As the distribution properties of TA(t)
and TB(t) are time invariant, this probability p(T ∗) is also time invariant,
and the second equality makes use of stochastical independence. Generally
p(T ∗) will depend on T ∗ and on the distribution F of TA and TB.
Using this probability, we further deÞne the following discount factor:
∆(T ∗) ≡
∞X
k=0
p(T ∗)(1− p(T ∗))k
(1 + r)k
=
(1− (1− F (T ∗))2) (1 + r)
r + (1− (1− F (T ∗))2) . (8)
This discount factor is the expected present value of one unit of eﬀort that is
spent in the Þrst period in whichmin{TA, TB} ≤ T ∗. E.g., min{TA, TB} ≤ T ∗
occurs for the Þrst time in period k (starting with k = 0) with probability
p(T ∗)(1− p(T ∗))k = (1− (1− F (T ∗))2)(1− F (T ∗))2k, and the present value
of one unit of eﬀort that is spent in period k is 1/(1 + r)k. Generally, the
discount factor ∆(T ∗) is decreasing in T ∗. We can now formally state our
main result:
Proposition 2 If
2T ∗ − (1− (1− F (T
∗))2) (1 + r)
r + (1− (1− F (T ∗))2)
Z y=T ∗
y=0
ydF (y) =
2ET
r
1
1 + r
(9)
has a unique solution for T ∗ ∈ [0, T¯ ], then there is a perfect equilibrium
in which the contestants delay the contest to the Þrst period t in which
min{TA(t), TB(t)} ≤ T ∗ and with equilibrium eﬀort choices in that period
given by (5) and (6) and with a prize of winning the contest in this period of
Z = 2ET/(r(1 + r)).
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A proof is as follows. We consider the contestants decision whether to
declare war or to delay. We can restrict consideration to the case TB > TA
in a given period, because, for the case TA > TB, the contestants A and B
simply switch roles, and because the case TA = TB has zero probability.
If min{TA, TB} ≥ 2ET/(r(1 + r)) neither A nor B wants to enter a war
in this period, because in such a war they would dissipate the present value
of all future rents.
If min{TA, TB} = TA < 2ET/(r(1+ r)), then A would prefer a delay. As
expected payoﬀ from war in period t is equal to TA(t) in the contest equi-
librium by Lemma 1, as this is As total payoﬀ from choosing xA = 0 which
is within As equilibrium support, whereas As payoﬀ from delay is strictly
positive (at least higher than TA(t)). This shows that the contestant with
the smaller income in a given period will always prefer delay. Accordingly,
the contestant with the higher income decides whether there will be war.
Consider Bs payoﬀs from war and no-war in a given period t if there was
no war prior to t and if min{TA, TB} = TA < 2ET/(r(1 + r)). In the case
of war, B receives an equilibrium payoﬀ that is equal to TB(t)+2ET/(r(1+
r))−TA(t). Bs income in period t is TB(t), and Bs payoﬀ from participating
in the contest, given that TB(t) > TA(t), is 2ET/(r(1+r))−TA(t) by Lemma
1, as 2ET/(r(1 + r)) is what B receives if B wins with probability 1, as B
wins with probability 1 if B chooses xB = TA(t), and as xB = TA(t) is in
Bs equilibrium support. If war is delayed, B receives his full period income
TB(t) and, by symmetry as regards the uncertain future, half the present
value of all future consumption ßows minus half of all future contest eﬀorts.
The present value of half of all future gross incomes equals ET/(r(1 + r)).
Consider the present value of the sum of expected contest eﬀorts. At most,
one contest takes place. Suppose for a moment that the contest takes place if
min{TA(t), TB(t)} ≤ T ∗ for some given T ∗. Then the sum of expected eﬀorts
in this contest is equal to
E(min{TA, TB} |min{TA, TB} ≤ T ∗ ) =
Z y=T ∗
y=0
ydF (y)
and contestant B bears half of this cost in expectation. In order to make this
cost comparable with the other elements of the payoﬀ, this expected contest
eﬀort needs to be discounted, and the discount factor is ∆(T ∗) as deÞned in
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(8). B is indiﬀerent between declaring or delaying war in period t if
TB(t) +
2ET
r
1
1 + r
− T ∗ (10)
= TB(t) +
ET
r
1
1 + r
− E(min{TA(t), TB(t)} |min{TA(t), TB(t)} ≤ T
∗ )
2
∆(T ∗)
Using (8), this equation simpliÞes to (9). The right-hand side in (9) is con-
stant. The left-hand side is smaller than this constant for suﬃciently small
T ∗. Accordingly, if the left-hand-side in (9) is continuous and (9) has a
unique solution, then it is preferable for B to declare war if TA(t) ≤ T ∗ and
it is optimal to delay war if TA(t) > T ∗. ¤
Proposition 2 shows that conßict is delayed until a period is reached in
which one of the rivals is suﬃciently weak to make it inexpensive for the
stronger contestant to initiate war and defeat the weak rival. The intuition
of the result is as follows. The more constrained, or weaker, contestant
has nothing to gain from a contest in this period. The eﬀort constraint he
faces puts him at a serious disadvantage if there is a contest. Accordingly,
it is the less constrained, or stronger, contestant who possibly initiates
the conßict. This stronger contestant compares his costs and beneÞts of
conßict. Whereas the gains (gross of eﬀort) from immediate conßict are
independent of the endowments that the contestants have in this period,
the cost of initiating conßict is increasing in the weaker rivals endowment,
because this endowment determines the stronger contestants eﬀort needed
for him to win. If the endowment of the weaker contestant is suﬃciently low,
the resources needed to defeat him are small enough to make the conßict
worthwhile.
It is interesting to contrast this outcome with the results in the power
transition theory of war. This theory suggests that war takes place when
the weaker rival catches up, and is most likely to take place in the range when
one of the rivals approaches the strength of the other rival. We Þnd that wars
take place if their cost is low, which is the case if one of the contestants is
weak and, hence, an easy target.
4 Contest success functions with noise
The contest in which the contestant who spends the highest eﬀort wins with
certainty is an interesting benchmark case that highlights the importance of
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the weakness of the weaker contestant for the stronger players decision to
initiate war. Additional aspects such as relative strength may also play a role
for diﬀerent contest success functions. To see this, we turn to an example in
which the probability of winning equals the ratio between the contestants
own contest eﬀort and the sum of his and his rivals contest eﬀort. This
contest success function is frequently used to describe a contest in many
areas of economics and political science. In the area of rent seeking it goes
back to Tullock (1980). It allows for some noise in the contest outcome, as
it implies that the contestant who spends less eﬀort than his rival also has a
smaller, but still positive chance to win. Formally, this function is given by
pA(xA, xB) ≡
½ xA
xA+xB
if min{xA, xB} > 0
1/2 if xA = xB = 0
.
The function has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and has been given
microeconomic underpinnings, e.g., by Mortensen (1982), Hirshleifer and Ri-
ley (1992), Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and Baye and Hoppe (2002). The
set of pairs of incomes in which no contest takes place in a given period
depends not only on the speciÞc contest success function, but also on the
distribution of income pairs. Contestant A prefers not to enter a contest in
a given period t, if
x∗A +
V
1 + r
>
x∗A
x∗A + x
∗
B
2E(T )
r(1 + r)
.
Here, x∗R is Rs equilibrium choice of eﬀort if the contest takes place in the
respective period, and obeys the constraint x∗R ≤ TR. V is the value of being
ruler of a territory at the beginning of a period before the resources in this
period are known to the rivals, if no contest had taken place previously, that
is, if a rival ruler exists in this period. In order to calculate V , F (T ) must
be further speciÞed.
Even for simple versions of F (T ), the calculations are non-trivial, also
because the constraint 0 ≤ x∗R ≤ TR is sometimes, but not always, bind-
ing. We restrict consideration here to an example in which the constraint
is binding for all possible outcomes of TA and TB. Suppose TA(t) and TB(t)
are identically distributed, and pairwise and intertemporally stochastically
independent. Let them take values from the set {0.8, 1, 1.2} with equal prob-
abilities of 1/3. Suppose further that r = 0.12. In this case there are nine
possible combinations of resources in a given period.
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We Þnd that the contest takes place if
(TA, TB) ∈ {(0.8, 1), (0.8, 1.2), (1, 0.8), (1.2, 0.8)},
whereas an equilibrium with no contest in this period exists if
(TA, TB) ∈ {(0.8, 0.8), (1, 1), (1, 1.2), (1.2, 1), (1.2, 1.2)}.
The following matrix shows the equilibrium choices of declaring or delaying
war for the diﬀerent combinations of period incomes.
TB = 0.8 TB = 1 TB = 1.2
TA = 0.8 delay B declares war B declares war
TA = 1 A declares war delay delay
TA = 1.2 A declares war delay delay
To conÞrm this, consider the value of being a ruler if this matrix ade-
quately describes future contest outcomes at the beginning of some period
when the available resources in this period are not yet known. This value
can be calculated to be equal to
V =
2 + 2.4 + .8
9
+ (5/9)V/(1.12) + (4/9)
8.3333
1.12
.
The Þrst term is the expected period income conditional on the contest be-
ing delayed. The second term is the present value of being a ruler at the
beginning of the next period, given that the contest has been delayed, times
the probability (5/9) with which the contest is delayed. The third term is
the expected payoﬀ from the states of conßict times the probability (4/9)
with which the contest takes place in this period. This payoﬀ equals the
present value of half the income ßow of the two territories, from next period
on. This is equal to 2ET
2
1
r
1
1+r
, or, using ET = 1 and r = .12, it is equal to
8.3333
1.12
. Accordingly, V = 7. 708 1. Now the payoﬀ from Þghting needs to be
compared with the payoﬀ from not Þghting in this period for each contestant
to conÞrm the respective choices. Note that it is enough for the contest to
take place if one of the rivals prefers Þghting to not Þghting in the respec-
tive period. For instance, for (TA(t), TB(t)) = (1.2, 0.8), A prefers to enter a
contest. As payoﬀ is equal to 1.2+ 7. 708 1
1.12
= 8. 082 2 if no contest takes place
in this period, and As payoﬀ equals 1.2
2
2
(0.12)(1.12)
= 8. 928 6 if a contest takes
place in this period.
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In the analysis in section 4 the weakness of the weaker contestant was
decisive for whether the conßict was delayed. The example in this section
shows that, more generally, both the size and the diﬀerence between the
contestants endowments can matter for the timing of the contest.
5 Negotiations
Before a war is initiated, the rivals may consider bargaining and Þnding a
cooperative agreement. Much of the recent literature on rational war has
considered the question of why wasteful wars occur despite possible negotia-
tions. In the formal analysis we did not allow for negotiations of contestants
at the onset of war. This simpliÞed the game structure, but is also justiÞable
here, because allowing for such negotiations does not change the equilibrium
outcome. Negotiations could not be successful here, at least for a wide pa-
rameter range. Like in GarÞnkel and Skaperdas (2000), there is a parameter
range in which negotiations break down as a result of a lack of contractibility,
even though there is no asymmetric information between rivals. Contracts
that yield an outcome that is Pareto superior to war require commitment
about future resources or future decisions, and cannot be enforced.
A few reasonable assumptions lead to this outcome. First, rivals cannot
contract on who rules in future periods, on future transfers, or on future
decisions to start a war. Whoever rules a given territory has full control over
the resources generated in this territory in the relevant period. Hence, the
only feasible states are the status quo with two independent rulers who each
control one territory, and the state in which one of the rulers has eliminated
the other and gained full control of both territories.
To analyse negotiations, consider a particular period t with endowments
TA and TB in this period. A and B could delay, contest, or negotiate. We
already determined the equilibrium of non-cooperative behavior (delay or
actual contest). Consider whether negotiations could make both contestants
strictly better-oﬀ. As a matter of convention let A be the weaker rival in the
given period. We concentrate on the fully discriminatory contest and on a
pair of period outputs TA and TB for which war occurs in this peroid in the
absence of negotiations. Hence, without negotiations, conßict takes place in
this period, leading to payoﬀs
(TB − TA) + 2ET
r(1 + r)
(11)
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for B and a payoﬀ of zero for A. Suppose A and B could negotiate about a
transfer fromA toB and a binding agreement thatB does not attackA in this
period. The mostA could oﬀer toB in exchange for this agreement is TA, that
is, the total amount of resources available to A in this period. If B accepts,
this will lead to a two-ruler regime in the next period. The expected payoﬀ
for B depends on whether there will be war in the future or not and on future
negotiations and hence is not well determined. However, the case in which
there is no war in the future (e.g., due to successful periodwise negotiations)
gives an upper limit to Bs expected future payoﬀ and, considering A and B
as symmetric at the beginning of the next period when their resources are
not yet known to them, this upper limit is one half of all future beneÞts:
ET/(r(1 + r)). Accordingly, in this continuation game, negotiations and
abstinence from war give B an expected payoﬀ that cannot exceed
TB + TA +
ET
r(1 + r)
. (12)
As discussed, this maximum is reached if B receives the maximum transfer
that is feasible, and if, for whatever reason, the two rulers co-exist in the
future. Comparing (11) and (12) reveals that negotiations must fail if
ET
r(1 + r)
> 2TA. (13)
If condition (13) holds, then the stronger rival Bs beneÞt of destroying and
eliminating A as a future rival for all times and receiving the income from
As territory is larger than the sum of the savings in military eﬀort and of
the maximum possible transfer.
This consideration shows that ruling out binding contracts about future
periods leads to a situation in which war is the rational outcome if one of
the contestants becomes suﬃciently weak, even if negotiations and a binding
commitment to abstain in exchange for transfers from the weaker ruler are
technically feasible. The condition determining whether negotiations could
avoid war also reveals that successful negotiations are less likely to be feasible
the weaker the weak ruler is. This result is reverse of the predictions made
by the transition theory of war that suggests that war is unlikely if rivals
are very unequal in strength and becomes more likely if the weaker rival
catches up with the dominant but declining power. The main reason for the
failure to avoid a war by negotiations among rivals who are currently very
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unequal is the inability of the weaker ruler to constrain its future resource use
and own future power in current negotiations, which seems to be a plausible
assumption.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we considered contestants decision to enter a contest or to de-
lay the contest to a future period. We showed that the contest is sometimes
delayed and we characterize the main determinant of delay. Contestants re-
source constraints matter. They are more likely to prefer to initiate a contest
when their rival is weaker, and, in particular, if their rival is suﬃciently
weak to be an easy target that does not need many resources to defeat him.
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